The administrative report indicates that the purpose of the requirement at issue was to enable the contracting officer to evaluate the contractor's ability to perform. This is a factor of "responsibility" and information in connection therewith may be submitted after bid opening and is not normally a part of the bid. Cf. 37 Comp. Gen. 143. The intendment of the provision in question is supported by the language of paragraph GC-6 of "Part II-General Conditions of Specifications to Lump Sum Construction Contracts"-included as a part of the invitation-which reads:

GC-6. SUBCONTRACTORS: At the request of the Contracting Officer the contractor shall notify the Contracting Officer, in writing, of the names of all subcontractors, together with a summary of the extent and character of the work to be done by each subcontractor. If for sufficient reason, at any time during the progress of the work, the Contracting Officer determines that any subcontractor is incompetent or undesirable, he will notify the contractor accordingly and immediate steps will be taken for cancellation of such subcontract. Subletting by subcontractors shall be subject to the same regulations. Nothing contained in this contract shall create any contractual relation between the subcontractor and the Government.

If the provision "SUB-CONTRACTING" were interpreted to require, as a material part of the bid, the names of and other requested data concerning the proposed subcontractors, the first sentence of paragraph GC-6 would be unnecessary since the data would already have been provided in the bid. For the same reason, the interpretation urged by you would be inconsistent with section 1-307 (iii) of the Armed Services Procurement Regulation and paragraph 1–307.1 (b) of the Army Procurement Procedure which require that in determining the responsibility of a bidder prior to award (which determination is normally based on data developed after bids are opened and the otherwise responsive low bidder is selected) consideration be given to the ability of the bidder to make adequate subcontractor arrangements which may be required. In other words, where the determination of the adequacy of subcontractor arrangements is an integral part of the process whereby responsibility is determined on the basis of data collected after bid opening, it appears illogical that a significant portion of that data would be required as an essential part of the bid.

Where designated information is by the terms of the invitation required to be submitted with the bid, the inference arises that such information is regarded by the Government as material so that the failure to accompany the bid with such information requires that the bid be rejected. To that extent, the language of the invitation may be regarded as somewhat misleading. On the other hand, we believe that invitations, like contracts, should be so interpreted as to give meaning to each part. As indicated above, to give the provision in question the meaning you urge would render paragraph GC-6 meaningless. For that reason and since such interpretation would be inconsistent with

the cited regulatory provisions, we do not feel justified in disturbing the award as made. We are, however, by separate letter, requesting the Secretary of the Army to take whatever steps may be necessary to insure that future invitations of this type are couched in language which will clearly advise bidders of the nature of the requirement and the effect of failure to comply therewith.

[B-140663]

Civilian

Personnel-Travel

Time-Transfers-Excess

Travel Time-Charge to Annual Leave-Travel Beginning on Nonworkday

An employee who, under a transfer travel-order which authorized the use of a privately owned automobile not to exceed the cost by common carrier, elects to begin travel by automobile on a nonworkday, even though the orders permitted but did not direct travel to begin at that time, has placed himself in a travel status upon departure within the purview of the Standardized Government Travel Regulations which require that the employee travel directly and without delay so that the travel time, while not limited to the time by common carrier, is for computation from the time the employee began travel on the basis of the reasonable driving time direct to the new station.

An employee who, under a transfer travel order which authorized the use of a privately owned automobile, not to exceed the cost by common carrier, left his old station on Saturday-a nonworkday-at 8:30 p.m. and arrived at the new station which was 601 miles distant at 2:10 p.m. four days later is entitled to have the travel time based on reasonable driving time computed from the time of departure to the beginning of the fourth day; therefore, a charge to annual leave for the third day based on excess travel time computed on common carrier time was improper, but a charge to annual leave for the five hours of excess travel time on the fourth day is required.

To the Secretary of the Interior, September 30, 1959:

On August 31, 1959, the Acting Assistant Commissioner of Reclamation, reference 540, requested our decision concerning travel time allowable to an employee traveling by privately owned vehicle on a permanent change of duty station. In connection with your subordinate's request for our decision, we direct your attention to the provisions of section 8 of the act of July 3, 1894, 28 Stat. 207, 208 as amended, 31 U.S.C. 74, which authorizes advance decisions by our Office only upon the request of a disbursing officer or the head of any executive department or other establishment not under any of the executive departments. 26 Comp. Gen. 993. However, since the question appears presently before your Department, and in order to avoid delay, the request in this instance will be answered as if it had come from you.

The question involves an employee of the Bureau of Reclamation who was reassigned from Oak View, California, to Lewiston, California, a distance of 601 miles. His usual nonworkdays are Saturday and Sunday. Travel was authorized by privately owned automobile,

reimbursement not to exceed the cost of common carrier. The travel order provided for his travel to begin on or about Sunday, March 15, 1959, and to end on or about Tuesday, March 17, 1959. No date was fixed for reporting to his new duty station. The employee left his old station at 8:05 p.m. on Saturday, March 14, and reported for duty at the new station at 2:10 p.m. on March 17. We assume that neither his travel orders nor the administrative travel regulations refer specifically to the allowable travel time without charge to leave in this type of case. The agency charged him 8 hours of annual leave for March 16 and 5 hours of annual leave for March 17 on the basis that he could have arrived at his new station in time to begin work on March 16 if he had traveled by common carrier departing, as he did, on Saturday night.

Although matters of charging leave to an employee are primarily matters for the administrative office, our Office will in an appropriate factual situation disapprove the granting of excessive time off without a charge to annual leave, as well as an unwarranted charge of annual leave.

Sections 1.1, 1.2, 3.3, and 6.10 of the Standardized Government Travel Regulations require that an employee traveling at Government expense perform the necessary travel without delay and in an economical

manner.

In 38 Comp. Gen. 513, 515, we stated:

We know of no sound or reasonable basis upon which to conclude that travel time on permanent change of station might be allowed for any purpose other than to accomplish the travel required under the change of station orders. Consequently, unless the collateral consideration of convenience to the traveler can fit within that framework, we are of the opinion that any time for travel arising from personal reasons, to the extent that it exceeds the travel time necessary to meet the basic travel requirements in a manner and by a means in which it can be said that the Government's interest is involved, should not be considered as authorized travel time, but properly should be a charge against authorized leave of absence.

We held in 31 Comp. Gen. 278 that an employee may be required to travel on nonworkdays, and we see no reason why the requirement that the employee travel directly and without delay should not be applied because he, although not directed to do so, begins travel on a nonworkday under transfer orders which permit the official travel to begin at that time. The employee, having elected to begin travel under his travel authorization on Saturday, is held to have entered a travel status at that time. Therefore, travel time must be computed in this case from the time the employee began his travel. 38 Comp. Gen. 513, 516, also states:

***Consequently, we assume, generally, that authorization to travel by any mode directed or permitted by the travel orders has been extended on the basis of an administrative determination that the use of that mode is in the Government's interest, and we will not object to the computation of travel time

required to perform the necessary travel by that mode, unless evidence is available which clearly indicates that the mode used in a particular case actually was authorized primarily for the convenience of the traveler to enable him to be absent from his assigned duties for personal reasons in connection with matters such as the granting of leave or the performance of circuitous travel. [Italics supplied.]

Therefore, our view is that the employee's travel time in this case is not limited to the time required by common carrier, but rather is to be based on reasonable driving time. In this instance, it would seem reasonable to require the employee to have traveled 601 miles between 8:05 p.m., March 14 and the beginning of the working day on March 17.

For the reasons stated we do not consider the annual leave charged the employee here concerned for March 16, 1959, was proper; however, our view is that annual leave properly was charged for the 5 hours he was absent on March 17.

[B-140472]

Civilian Personnel-Holiday Compensation-July 4, 1959

The act of September 22, 1959, Public Law 86-362, which provides that when holidays fall on Saturday the preceding day may be considered a holiday, is inapplicable to holidays which fall on the regular weekly nonworkday which is in lieu of Sunday; therefore, employees who had a regular weekly tour of duty Sunday through Thursday and who had July 3 and July 4, 1959, off, and worked on Sunday July 5, 1959, come under section 4 (b) of Executive Order No. 10358 which provides that when a holiday falls on a regular weekly nonworkday in lieu of Sunday, the next workday will be considered a holiday, and such employees are entitled to holiday compensation for work on such day.

To the Attorney General, October 2, 1959:

On August 11, 1959, the Administrative Assistant Attorney General submitted for advance decision a voucher covering holiday pay for eight employees of the National Training School for Boys for working on July 5, 1959, a Sunday, which was the first day of those employees' regular workweek, Friday and Saturday, July 3 and 4, being their regular days off.

The questions presented are stated as follows:

Reference is made to Civil Service Commission Circular 1012 dated June 26, 1959, question and answer No. 4, wherein it was stated that Executive Order 10825 superseded Sec. 4(b) of Executive Order 10358 for the days July 3rd and July 4th, 1959, and the employee is entitled to a compensatory day off in Fiscal Year 1960 for Friday, July 3, 1959. Does this interpretation mean that the employee who had Friday and Saturday off and worked Sunday, July 5th is ineligible for holiday pay? If so, is he entitled to a day off for the holiday since it fell on his second day off as well as a day off for Friday? It is indeed difficult for us to conceive of Executive Order 10825 as intending to reduce a benefit already established, i.e., by substituting a day of compensatory time off for the holiday pay benefit previously existing.

With the enactment of Public Law 86-362, approved September 22, 1959, 5 U.S.C. 2064 (d), it becomes unnecessary to consider the effect Executive Order No. 10825 may have had on the questions involved here. That act which is expressly retroactive to July 1, 1959, provides generally that, when a holiday falls on Saturday or—in the case of employees whose basic workweek is other than Monday through Friday on the regular weekly nonworkday scheduled in lieu of Saturday, the preceding day shall be held and considered to be a regular holiday. By specific language, the act has no application, however, when the holiday falls on the regular weekly nonworkday scheduled for such employees in lieu of Sunday. Therefore, the provisions of section 4(b) of Executive Order No. 10358 govern in such situations. Section 4(b) provides that, when a holiday falls on a regular weekly nonworkday in lieu of Sunday, the next workday will be considered to be a holiday.

Therefore, the employees involved here, for whom July 4, 1959, was the regular weekly day off in lieu of Sunday, were entitled to a day off on July 5 and they are entitled to holiday compensation