King v. Carmichael. tations." Thomas v. Pickering, 13 Me. 337; Marcy v. Marcy, 6 Met. (Mass.) 360, 371; Wright v. Saddler, 20 N. Y. 320 (329). Although Lemuel King and the appellant became tenants in common from and after the death of Lydia J. King, from whom both derived title, it does not necessarily follow, upon principle or upon authority, that this relation continued and involved Thomas Tate and subsequent grantees. A deed from one of several cotenants, to a person in exclusive adverse possession, conveying absolutely all the property, does not make the grantee a cotenant with the other holders of the legal title, and so render his possession not adverse. Frick v. Sinon, 75 Cal. 337; Irey v. Markey, 132 Ind. 546, 32 N. E. Rep. 309. In the last case, the court said: "Assuming that the deed was void, possession having been taken under it, it was sufficient to give color of title as against the grantors, and to set in motion the statute of limitations." A vendee in fee derives his title from the vendor, but his title, though derivative, is adverse to that of the vendor. He enters and holds possession for himself, and not for the vendor. Blight's Lessee v. Rochester, 7 Wheat. 535 (547, 548); Society, etc., v. Town of Pawlett, etc., 4 Pet. U. S. 480, S. C. Book 7, L. C. P. Co. 927 (937), marginal p. 507. A bona fide purchaser holds adversely to all the world. He may disclaim the title under which he entered and set up any other title and any other defense alike against his grantor and against others. Den on Demise of Croxall v. Sherrerd, Book 18, Lawyers' Co-op., etc., reprint U. S. Sup. Ct. R. 572 (579); Watkins v. Holman, 16 Pet. *25; Jackson v. Huntington, 5 Pet. 402; Willison King v. Carmichael. v. Watkins, 3 Pet. 43; Voorhees v. White's Heirs, 2 Marsh. 26; Winlock v. Hardy, 4 Lit. 272. It has been held that "Where one has knowledge of facts sufficient to put him upon inquiry, he is chargeable with knowledge of all matters which he could have learned with reasonable inquiry." Kuhns v. Gates, 92 Ind. 70. In (B. Monroe) 52 Ky. Rep. 436, the court held that where one of two joint tenants sells and conveys a tract of land and gives possession, the grantee's title and possession is adverse to that of the other joint tenant, and if the grantee hold a sufficient length of time by a continued open renunciation of the title of his cotenant, he may acquire title. Buswell on Lim., etc., section 24, p. 37, states it to be a general rule of the civil law that prescription begins to run from the time when the creditor acquires a full and perfect right to prosecute his demand. The period of limitation is to be computed from the time at which the creditor may legally prosecute his action. Jacobs v. Graham, 1 Blackf. 392; Wright v. Tichenor, 104 Ind. 185. The statute of limitations begins to run, as to persons under legal disabilities, when the action accrues, but if it has fully run before the disability expires, an action may be brought within the time limited after the disability is removed. Barnett v. Harshbarger, Admr., 105 Ind. 410; Davidson v. Bates, 111 Ind. 391; Lehman v. Scott, 113 Ind. 76; Royse v. Turnbaugh, 117 Ind. 539; Wright v. Kleyia, 104 Ind. 223; Bauman v. Grubbs, 26 Ind. 419 (421); Herff v. Griggs, 121 Ind. 471 (476); Sims v. Gay, 109 Ind. 501; Walker v. Hill, 111 Ind. 223. The phrase, "under legal disabilities," includes infants. R. S. 1881, section 296; Bauman v. Grubbs, supra. King v. Carmichael. The statute begins to run against infants precisely as against adults, when the right of action has accrued and is complete. Davidson v. Bates, supra. The only effect of appellant's disability of infancy was to give him, if the full limitation had run during his disability, two years under section 296, R. S. 1881, after he had attained the age of twenty-one years, within which he might sue. Herff v. Griggs, supra, and numerous cases there cited. Under the Revised Statutes of 1881, section 255, appellant, although an infant, could have sued as soon as Tate was put in possession under his first deed. Appellant was five years, one month and sixteen days old when Tate took possession under the guardian's deed. This suit was commenced August 25th, 1890, exactly twenty-four years and nineteen days after appellant's right of action accrued against the grantee. Appellant became twenty-one years of age June 19th, 1882, exactly eight years, two months and six days before this suit was commenced, and eight years, three months and one day before he filed his answer and cross-complaint in this action, and this was the first claim made by him for his one-sixth interest in the real estate in controversy. He has slept upon his rights, and under the statute of limitations, which is one of repose, he can not now recover. In view of the authorities cited, the infant was not entitled to notice in order to set the statute in motion. The undisturbed possession, as shown by the reply, raises the presumption of notice and constitutes a complete bar when the period has elapsed. What we have said in considering the demurrer to the second paragraph of the reply, applies equally well to all the paragraphs of the replies and answers demurred to, so far as the questions of the statutes of limitations, ouster, notice, and infancy McClanahan v. Williams et al. are involved, and we think the court below did not err in any of its rulings of which complaint is made. Judgment affirmed. Filed Nov. 27, 1893. No. 16,495. MCCLANAHAN v. WILLIAMS ET AL. DECEDENT'S ESTATE.-Presumption.-In Favor of Testacy or Intestacy? -Election of Widow.-The change in the rule of election-section 428, Elliott's Supp., requiring the widow to take under the will, unless she chooses, in legal manner, to take under the law-does not create a presumption against intestacy and in favor of testacy, but the presumption of intestacy still obtains. REAL ESTATE.-Conveyance of Husband's Lands.-Joinder of Infant Wife.-Disaffirmance.— Inchoate Interest.-Recovery of.-Where an infant wife joins with her husband in the conveyance of his lands, before such wife can maintain an independent action to set aside her deed made in infancy, she must disaffirm; but where the grantee gets into court first, and seeks a confirmation, it will not be too late, on that account, to disaffirm before filing her pleading to obtain her interest, if in fact she is required to disaffirm at all. SAME.-Conveyance by Wife of Inchoate Interest.-Infancy.—Disaffirmance.-Statute of Limitations.-Right of Action, When Accrues.-Husband and Wife.—Where an infant wife joins in a conveyance of land by her husband, disaffirmance, after she obtains her majority, could lend no force to her rights, as long as her interest therein remains inchoate, and the statute of limitations will not begin to run until her interest becomes absolute by the death of her husband, for an action could not be maintained to annul the deed, to quiet title, or for possession, as long as the wife's interest remains inchoate and contingent. PLEADING.-Misnomer of.-Does not Affect Rights.-The name given to a pleading does not determine its character, and the rights of litigants are not lost by a misnomer of their pleading. From the Sullivan Circuit Court. J. T. Hays and H. J. Hays, for appellant. McClanahan v. Williams et al. HACKNEY, J.-The appellant sued to quiet his title to a tract of land in Sullivan county. The appellee Sarah C. Williams filed what she denominated a counterclaim, in which she alleged that in 1864 she was but fifteen years of age and was the wife of Elijah W. Williams, who then owned the land in question; that in said year she and her said husband joined in a conveyance of said lands to the appellant; that thereafter, and until in 1891, she continued to be the wife of said Elijah W. Williams, who, in said last named year, departed this life; that on the 2d day of November, 1891, she disaffirmed said conveyance, and gave notice thereof to the appellant. She prayed partition, by which onethird of said lands might be set off to her and two-thirds to the appellant. To this pleading the appellant responded in what he called an answer, in which he alleged an innocent and good faith purchase, a continuous and uninterrupted adverse possession, valuable improvements, constant occupancy and payment of taxes, all under color of title and open and notorious claim of ownership; that during the twenty-seven years of his occupancy, claim of ownership and making of improvements, and up to the commencement of this suit, the appellee Sarah, with full knowledge of all of the facts, stood by, concealed her infancy and claim of ownership, and gave no notice of disaffirmance until the commencement of this suit, and that she became twenty-one years of age more than twenty years before this suit was commenced. The court overruled appellant's demurrer to appellee's counterclaim, and sustained the appellee's demurrer to the appellant's answer thereto. These rulings present the questions for consideration by this court. The record discloses a default by William R., Frank, and Martha A. Williams, and an answer |